Channel State Information (CSI) has been proposed to enhance physical layer security between a transmitter and a receiver because it decorrelates over half wavelength distances in rich scattering environments. Consequently, CSI was employed to generate passwords, to authenticate the source of packets, and to inject artificial noise to thwart eavesdroppers. However, in this paper, we present CSIsnoop, and show that an attacker can infer CSI in a multi-user WLAN, even if both channel sounding sequences from the access point and CSI measurement feedback from the clients are encrypted. The insights of CSIsnoop are that the CSI of clients can be computed based on transmit beamforming weights at the access point, and that the transmit beamforming weights can be estimated from downlink multi-user transmission. We implement CSIsnoop on a software defined radio and conduct experiments in various indoor environments. Our results show that on average CSIsnoop can infer CSI of the target client with an absolute normalized correlation of over 0.99, thereby urging reconsideration of the use of CSI as a tool to enhance physical layer security in multi-user WLANs.
increase throughput by concurrently sending multiple data streams to multiple clients. According to IEEE 802.11ac/af [7, 8] , a known channel sounding sequence is broadcasted by the AP, from which clients compute and feedback their measurement results of the channel's effect on the known sequence. Based on the collected CSI, the AP can compute transmit beamforming weights and, for example, zero-force the signals of one client at other clients in order to eliminate inter-client interference [2, 24] . Moreover, CSI can be also used to increase network throughput by grouping clients with orthogonal channels [24, 25] .
Besides data transmission, CSI has also been proposed to enhance network security, because it decorrelates over half a wavelength (several centimeters in 2.4/5 GHz WiFi) in rich scattering environments. Therefore, wireless devices can employ CSI for secret key establishment [12] , which appears especially promising when there are limited resources or lacking key management infrastructure. In addition, CSI can be used as a signature to authenticate the source of packets, as each client in the network will have a unique CSI signature [9, 22] . Finally, CSI can be used to inject artificial noise orthogonal to the intended recipient to degrade an eavesdropper's channel [1, 5] . Such artificial noise is nulled at the clients by the AP so that the signal SINR at the clients will not be reduced.
Because of the importance of CSI, it has been proposed to encrypt CSI during the standard-defined explicit channel sounding process: either by encrypting the measurement feedback from the clients, or by encrypting the channel sounding sequence from the AP [19] . Therefore, a malicious node within range of the network cannot learn clients' CSI by overhearing their measurement feedback.
However, we discover that the above methods cannot ensure the confidentiality of CSI in multi-user MIMO WLANs. In particular, in this paper we describe CSIsnoop, a framework by which a passive attacker can infer the CSI of clients by overhearing their downlink beamforming transmission. The first step of CSIsnoop is to employ the knowledge of part of the transmitted symbols (e.g., the MAC header) and trains an adaptive filter to separate the different data streams at the multiple-antenna malicious node (Eve), which we term as a known-transmitted-symbol attack (a PHY analogy of the known-plaintext attack). The malicious node subsequently estimates her channel from the AP and combines it with the adaptive filter to compute the transmit beamforming weights that the AP must have used. Finally, CSIsnoop uses the estimated beamforming weights to compute the CSI of clients. We analyze CSIsnoop with various number of clients within the network, and also show that even if the AP encrypts the channel sounding sequence [19] , it is still possible for the multiple-antenna malicious node to estimate CSI for both herself and the target client. Moreover, we discuss how an active adversary can accelerate the computing process by using a variant of CSIsnoop which we name CSIsnoop+a.
Our results reveal a fundamental conflict between using CSI to optimize PHY design and hiding CSI from malicious nodes, which urges reconsideration of the use of CSI to enhance physical layer security in multi-user WLANs. In particular, with CSIsnoop, we demonstrate that a malicious node can now break the following security schemes in multi-user WLANs:
• The malicious node can compute CSI of clients even if the AP encrypts the channel sounding sequence and the clients encrypt their CSI measurement feedback [19] .
• With the computed CSI, the malicious node can further estimate the CSI-based password [12] .
• With the computed CSI, the malicious node can fake CSIbased signatures [9, 22] .
• With the computed CSI, the malicious node can remove most of the artificial noise and decode the overheard packets [1, 5] . In addition, we show that CSIsnoop can be also employed to degrade downlink and uplink throughput in the network. Specifically, we identify a new threat, which we term selective jamming, to the uplink multi-user transmission in next generation wireless standards [4, 6, 18] : once the malicious node obtains the CSI of a target client, she can selectively jam the client's data stream in uplink multi-user transmission, while not interfering with the data streams from all other clients. This is fundamentally different from current jamming techniques [14, 23] , which treat all the concurrent data streams identically.
Finally, we implement CSIsnoop on WARP v3 [20] , deploy a testbed, and conduct experiments in various indoor environments. Specifically, we consider that the AP has 2, 3, or 4 antennas and collect measurements from over 100,000 over-the-air transmissions. Our main experimental results can be summarized as follows:
• With the adversary's average signal SNR being 30 dB and the average condition number of the channel matrix between the AP and the adversary being 5, CSIsnoop can infer the target client's CSI with an absolute normalized correlation of over 0.99.
• The accuracy of CSIsnoop is related to the attacker's channel: if Eve is able to move to a location with high signal strength but small condition number of her CSI matrix from the AP, she can perform better by observing just a single frame than if she were able to observe multiple frames but in a less favorable location. This also provides hints of how attacks based on CSIsnoop can be mitigated.
• CSIsnoop enables the malicious node to compute over 85% of the CSI-based password.
• For selective jamming, CSIsnoop creates a 20 dB average increase in interference to the uplink data stream of the target client compared to other clients. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces our threat model. Sec. 3 and Sec. 4 describe the principles of CSIsnoop and its variant CSIsnoop+a. We discuss implementation in Sec. 5 and experimental evaluations in Sec. 6. Several attack applications of CSIsnoop are explored in Sec. 7. Sec. 8 discusses related work and Sec. 9 concludes the paper. 
THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we consider the threat model illustrated in Fig. 1 . Alice is a multiple-antenna multi-user AP and each Bob is a legitimate single-antenna client. The network has multiple clients, i.e., multiple "Bobs". Within the scope of this paper, we consider that explicit channel sounding is employed (as is the case with IEEE 802.11ac/af [7, 8] ). That is Alice transmits beacons such that the Bobs can measure CSI and send the results back to Alice. However, each Bob can encrypt his CSI feedback in order to prevent malicious nodes from directly overhearing his CSI measurements. We also consider the case that Alice encrypts her broadcasted channel sounding sequence [19] (i.e., the beacon sequence is only known to Alice within the network). After acquiring Bobs' CSI H AB , Alice uses zero-forcing beamforming (ZF-BF) to compute her transmit beamforming weights, which is
ZF-BF has been widely used because it can asymptotically achieve network capacity with relatively low computational complexity [2, 11, 19, 24] . Nonetheless, the CSIsnoop framework can be extended to other different beamforming algorithms, e.g., conjugate beamforming. Moreover, we assume that Alice uses all of her antennas to transmit no matter what the number of data streams is. In other words, Alice will fully utilize her antenna resources to boost the downlink network throughput.
There is a malicious node, Eve, within range of Alice. We consider a rich scattering environment typical of an indoor WLAN so that Eve can overhear signals of Alice's downlink transmission to all Bobs. And Eve has the same number of antennas as Alice (Alice's antenna number can be known from the network control signals).
We further assume that Eve knows a subsequence of the symbols that are transmitted by Alice for each Bob's downlink data packet. These known symbols can be portions of the MAC packet header that follow a pre-defined format in the standards [7, 8] . Finally, we assume that Eve knows which Bobs are included in a specific downlink transmission. This can be done by Eve overhearing the control signals broadcasted by Alice before the data transmission, or the ACK packets sent from the Bobs after the data transmission.
CSISNOOP
In this section, we describe CSIsnoop, a technique by which a passive adversary can infer the CSI of different clients by overhearing downlink multi-user transmission. We begin by analyzing the base case where the number of data streams from Alice to the Bobs equals the number of antennas at Alice. Then we generalize to scenarios where the number of data streams is smaller. Finally, we show that Eve is able to estimate her channel (an important step of CSIsnoop) even if the channel sounding sequences are encrypted by Alice.
Base Case Analysis of K × K
To begin with, we first consider the base case of CSIsnoop as shown in Fig. 2 , where Alice has K antennas and beamforms K data streams to K Bobs in one downlink transmission. In this case, the pseudoinverse computation of ZF-BF is simplified to matrix inversion. Thus H AB and W A uniquely determine each other.
We denote the channel between Alice and Bob j to be H AB j , and
Eve also has K antennas, and the channel between Alice and Eve is 
where W A is Alice's transmit beamforming weights, P is the transmit power scaling matrix and
and N is random noise.
In order to compute H AB between Alice and the Bobs, Eve needs to first estimate W A used by Alice. We identify the knowntransmitted-symbol attack that can be employed by CSIsnoop to accomplish this. After that, Eve computes H AB based on the relationship between H AB and W A . We divide the whole process into 4 steps and discuss each of them as follows.
(1) Known-Transmitted-Symbol Attack. CSIsnoop employs known-transmitted-symbol attack to compute an adaptive filter based on only X and Y , and uses this filter to further compute H AE W A P. Specifically, if Eve knows the 1 × L vector X j of Bob j (as discussed in Sec. 2, these known symbols can be part of the MAC header that follow a pre-defined format in the standards [7, 8] ), she can compute a 1 × K receive beamforming vector W (1) E, j such that
is minimized. By taking the derivative of E{∥e
E, j and setting it to zero, Eve obtains
where Y † is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of Y .
Therefore, if Eve launches known-transmitted-symbol attack targeting Bobs' K data streams, she can compute
By ignoring the random noise N , Eve can estimate
Here W
E is a K × K square matrix because of the K data streams. So Eve can directly compute its inverse.
However, the above process will amplify the random noise N when calculating Y † , which degrades the accuracy of the estimation of H AE W A P. Therefore, instead of Eq. (2), CSIsnoop minimizes
which leads to W
and
In the following, we use W E to represent W 
This is because Eve has the same number of antennas as Alice and H AE is a K × K square matrix. Thus its inverse can be directly computed. (4) Computation of H AB . ZF-BF computes the transmit beamforming weights as the pseudo-inverse of the CSI matrix. For the base case, because the number of data streams equals the number of antennas at Alice, the pseudo-inverse computation is matrix inversion. As a result, Eve can compute
It should be noted that the j th row of P −1 H AB (which is 1
and the j th row of H AB are in the same sub-space. Therefore, even though Eve does not know P, she can still locate the signal subspace from Alice to Bob j . This already provides enough information for Eve to learn the relative relationship among the CSI of different Bobs, and to further break various CSI-based security mechanisms and decrease network throughput as discussed in Sec. 7.
Generalization to M × K with M < K
In the above base case analysis, we assume that the number of data streams from Alice to the Bobs in one downlink transmission equals the number of antennas at Alice. Therefore, Eve can directly compute the inverse of W A P in Eq. (10 possible that the number of data streams in one downlink transmission is smaller, e.g., not all Bobs are backlogged. Under such circumstances, while Eve can still compute Alice's transmit beamforming weights W A , H AB is no longer a square matrix and the sub-space spanned by each of its rows can be no longer uniquely determined by its pseudo-inverse. In the following, we discuss how CSIsnoop addresses this problem by overhearing multiple downlink transmissions.
We first use an example in Fig. 3 to illustrate Eve's computing process. Suppose that there are M s and M s+1 Bobs involved in transmission s and s + 1, respectively. And both M s and M s+1 are smaller than K. Because Eve has the same number of antennas as Alice, she can always compute W A P from Eq. (9). And we denote
] to be the multiplication of transmit beamforming weights and transmit power scaling matrix at Alice for downlink multi-user frame s and s + 1, respectively.
If Bob 1 is included in both transmissions, because ZF-BF transmits the data of all other Bobs into the null space of H AB 1 of Bob 1 , Eve can obtain
Consequently, when the total number of different Bobs that are included in these 2 transmissions is no smaller than K, Eve can have at least K − 1 uncorrelated vectors V from Eq. (11) such that H AB 1 V = 0, which enables Eve to locate the sub-space spanned by the 1 × K vector H AB 1 . Therefore, when the number of data streams in one downlink transmission is smaller than K, for Eve to compute H AB j , she needs to overhear multiple downlink multi-user transmissions that (1) each includes Bob j , and that (2) the total number of different Bobs that are involved should be no smaller than K. However, these multiple transmissions need not be consecutive as long as H AB j remains stable. In comparison, H AB i j of other Bobs can even vary during the transmissions. In fact, as can be observed from Eq. (11), a changing H AB i j will only increase the number of different V 's that Eve can have and thereby enable Eve to locate the sub-space of H AB j more quickly. H AE can also change as long as its variation can be detected by Eve so that Eq. (9) remains accurate.
Estimating H AE with Encrypted Channel Sounding Sequences
For explicit channel sounding, in order to prevent Eve from knowing Bobs' CSI by overhearing their measurement feedback, we can either (1) ask each Bob to encrypt his sounding feedback, or (2) ask Alice to encrypt her channel sounding sequences. However, as Figure 4 : VHT PPDU format of IEEE 802.11ac [7] and IEEE 802.11af [8] (with different length of each field). The Null Data Packet for explicit channel sounding has the same format except that there is no data field. We consider that Alice uses the CSIsec scheme [19] to encrypt her channel sounding sequences. Particularly, in each sub-carrier, Alice broadcasts a random symbol R instead of the known symbol D. Therefore, Bob j and Eve measure their channel as (R/D)H AB j and (R/D)H AE , respectively. Because Alice knows R/D, she can remove it from Bob j 's measurement feedback. In contrast, Eve does not know R/D and thereby cannot obtain H AE .
The key reason that Eve can estimate H AE in CSIsnoop is because she now has multiple antennas instead of only a single antenna as in the discussion of [19] . In particular, CSIsnoop combines the measured (R/D)H AE with the L-LTF field defined in IEEE 802.11ac/af to compute H AE . Fig. 4 shows the standard-defined packet format. The L-LTF field contains the long training sequence of IEEE 802.11a/b/g, and is designed to make IEEE 802.11ac compatible with IEEE 802.11a/b/g. However, to avoid un-intentional beamforming, the L-LTF field is sent with dynamic cyclic shift, i.e., a different phase shift is added to the signals sent by each of Alice's antennas. Such phase shifts are pre-defined in the standard and publicly known. Moreover, the L-LTF field is used by other clients to decode the following L-SIG field and thereby cannot be encrypted by Alice.
We still consider that both Alice and Eve have K antennas. In addition, we denote the known channel sounding symbol and its encrypted version from the i th antenna of Alice to be D i and R i , respectively. Therefore, from the channel sounding phase between Alice and the Bobs, Eve can compute
where
Suppose that the dynamic cyclic shift added to the i th antenna of Alice is β i . Thus from the L-LTF field of the same channel sounding packet, Eve can estimate
Combining Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), Eve can obtain
Since Eve knows 
CSISNOOP+A
In the discussion in Sec. 3, Eve is completely passive and computes H AB by only overhearing the downlink transmission from Alice to the Bobs. In this section, we describe a variant of CSIsnoop which we name CSIsnoop+a. For CSIsnoop+a, Eve becomes active and joins in the downlink multi-user transmission, which enables Eve to compute H AB more quickly in certain scenarios.
One of the examples is shown in Fig. 5 , where there are K − 1 single-antenna Bobs within the network. As a result, the maximum number of different Bobs that are included in multiple transmissions can only be K − 1. If Eve uses CSIsnoop to compute H AB j of Bob j , at least one H AB i j of Bob i need to change during the overheard multiple transmissions, so that Eve still has at least K − 1 uncorrelated vectors V for Eq. (11).
In comparison, if CSIsnoop+a is employed, Eve can locate H AB j much more quickly. As shown in Fig. 5 , Eve now fakes the legitimate client Bob K by using her first antenna and participates in the downlink multi-user transmission, i.e., she sends channel sounding measurements back to Alice and asks Alice to beamform downlink data to the faked Bob K (e.g., Eve can setup a remote server and ask the server to send data to the faked Bob K ). After that, Eve still uses her K antennas to overhear the K data streams, except that now she only needs to launch K − 1 known-transmitted-symbol attacks, because the first row of W E in Eq. (7) can be directly set to [0, . . . , 0, 1/ √ p K ]. Then Eve can obtain P −1 H AB by following step 2 to step 4 in Sec. 3.1.
In general, if there are N Bobs in the network and N < K, Eve can use her K − N antennas to pretend to be K − N clients and join in the downlink multi-user transmission. However, Eve still only needs to have K antennas in total. What is more, Eve can pretend to be legitimate clients using a subset of her antennas while at the same time overhear multiple downlink transmissions. Therefore, Eve does not need to have precise timing control of when her downlink data of the faked clients should arrive at the AP.
IMPLEMENTATION
Access Point (Alice) and Legitimate Clients (Bobs). We implement the functions of beamforming transmission of Alice and the Bobs in the software defined radio WARP v3 [20] . In particular, Alice broadcasts the channel sounding sequence defined in IEEE 802.11ac [7] from each of her antennas, which is used by the Bobs to measure their channel. After Alice receives the measurement feedback from the Bobs, she uses ZF-BF to calculate her transmit beamforming weights and beamforms Bobs' downlink data packet. We also implement the CSIsec scheme [19] , with which Alice encrypts the channel sounding sequence by multiplying it with a random complex number in each sub-carrier and for each of her antennas.
The transmission has a bandwidth of 20 MHz and includes 64 OFDM sub-carriers (based on IEEE 802.11ac). Bobs' data are modulated by BPSK or 4-QAM. And we use different WARP v3 boards to implement Alice and the Bobs so they are not clock-synchronized.
CSIsnoop and CSIsnoop+a. We also implement all steps and calculations of CSIsnoop and CSIsnoop+a as described above in WARP v3. Specifically, when Eve overhears the downlink transmission, she first uses the normal method [15] to correct the timing and carrier frequency offset (due to the different oscillator frequencies between devices) based on the L-STF and the L-LTF field of each packet. After that, even though Eve has not computed the transmit beamforming weights W A at Alice yet, she can still track and correct the residue carrier frequency offset with the aid of the pilot sub-carriers (these are reserved sub-carriers with pre-defined pilots throughout the entire packet [7, 8] ). Suppose that the pilot is α. According to the standards, it is the same for all data streams. Therefore, what Eve overhears can be represented as
Even if H AE W A P is not known by Eve, for her j th antenna, Y j /α should have a fixed phase over time if there is no residue carrier frequency offset (but it can have different values across Eve's antennas). Therefore, by tracking the phase of every Y j /α, Eve can detect and correct the residue carrier frequency offset. Eve can subsequently begin to compute H AE W A P by knowntransmitted-symbol attack (Eq. (7)). In our implementation, we directly minimize the mean square error for this computation. While this has computational complexity of O(n 3 ) (n is the size of the matrix X ), it is optimal. Alternatively, we can use the iterative Least Mean Square algorithm to reduce computational complexity [16] .
Finally, after Eve overhears multiple packets within channel coherence time of H AB j (during which H AB j stays stable), she can combine her estimates together to increase accuracy. However, Eve cannot simply compute the average value, because different packets will have different (1) transmit power scaling factors and (2) fractional timing offsets. The impact of scaling factors has already been discussed in Sec. 3.1. In the following, we analyze the impact of fractional timing offset.
Fractional timing offset is mainly due to the ADC sampling at the receiver. Particularly, in wireless networks the correlation computation of the training sequences in the L-STF and the L-LTF field is used to determine the start of a packet among a series of sampling points [15] . Because this computation occurs in the Figure 7 : Experiment timeline.
digital domain, the actual start of the packet may deviate from the computed point with a maximum error of ∆ 2 , where ∆ is the ADC sampling interval (as shown in Fig. 6 ). Therefore, even if the physical channel stays unchanged, the actual channel that the packets go through will be different. According to the Fourier transform, delay in the time domain translates into rotation over sub-carriers in the frequency domain. As a result, each estimated H AB at Eve will also have an additional unknown phase rotation.
To address the different transmit power scaling factors and fractional timing offsets, when Eve has a set of observations
with constraint ∥Ĥ AB j ∥ = 1. The evaluation in Sec. 6.4 shows that this will lead to a significantly more accurate result compared to simply calculating the average.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct experiments in various indoor environments to evaluate the performance of CSIsnoop and CSIsnoop+a. We first describe our experimental setup. Then we discuss the accuracy of the estimated H AB as well as the impact of various factors beginning with the base case, followed by the generalized scenarios. Finally, we study how accurately Eve can estimate H AE when Alice encrypts her channel sounding sequence.
Experimental Setup
We use our WARP v3 implementation to conduct experiments in typical lab, office, and apartment environments. Alice is configured to have 2, 3, or 4 antennas and beamform data to up to 4 singleantenna Bobs. Eve has the same number of antennas as Alice and stays within Alice's transmitting range. Therefore, Eve can overhear Bobs' downlink packets and use CSIsnoop to compute H AB . During the experiments, we collect more than 100,000 over-the-air packets. Due to the extra delay of the WARPLab framework [21] , in order to ensure that the experiment is finished within channel coherence time (during which the channel stays stable), we divide it into 2 phases. In the first phase, we continuously measure H AB,meas for over 100 ms. In the second phase, we first ask Alice to broadcast the channel sounding sequence (to emulate the explicit channel sounding process), by which Eve can estimate H AE . After that, Alice sends the pre-computed downlink beamforming data packets to the Bobs, which are based on the previously collected H AB,meas . Eve launches known-transmitted-symbol attack targeting these downlink packets and uses CSIsnoop to compute H AB,comp . The timeline of the experiment is shown in Fig. 7 . 
Accuracy of CSIsnoop
We first define a metric for estimation accuracy. As discussed in Sec. 3.1, Eve only needs to compute the sub-space spanned by H AB j instead of its exact value. Therefore, it is natural to use the degree of correlation as the evaluating metric. In particular, we use the absolute value of the normalized correlation, which is defined as
for H AB j of Bob j . C ranges from 0 to 1. C = 0 indicates that H AB j ,comp and H AB j ,meas are orthogonal, while C = 1 indicates that H AB j ,comp and H AB j ,meas are perfectly correlated. Therefore, the closer to 1 is C, the more accurate the estimation is by Eve. We assume that Eve uses 20 known symbols for the knowntransmitted-symbol attack according to [16] . And Fig. 8(a) displays the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of C when Eve's average signal SNR is 30 dB and when the average condition number of H AE is 5 (the influence of signal SNR and condition number are discussed later in Sec. 6.3). As a baseline for comparison, we also plot the CCDF of correlation between H AB j ,meas and H AE : if CSIsnoop is not employed, we suppose that Eve uses H AE to infer H AB j . The results indicate that CSIsnoop enables Eve to locate the sub-space spanned by H AB j with very high accuracy. For all 2-, 3-, and 4-antenna Alice, the average value of C largely increases from 0.46 to over 0.99.
We further zoom in the upper-right portion of Fig. 8(a) and show the details in Fig. 8(b) . For 2-antenna Alice, it can be seen that over 99% of Eve's CSI inferences yield C larger than 0.99. However, the estimation accuracy decreases with the number of antennas at Alice. The main reason is that more noise will be included into the computation when Alice has more antennas.
Impact of H AE
In the following, we study the influence of Eve's relative position to Alice via H AE on CSIsnoop's accuracy. H AE is important because (1) if Eve is mobile or there are multiple Eves, CSIsnoop can search for places with favorable H AE to reduce the estimation error; and (2) Alice can also use the connection between H AE and CSIsnoop's accuracy to design schemes to prevent H AB from being computed.
Strength of H AE . On average, the strength of H AE determines the signal SNR at Eve (while for each overheard packet, the SNR is also related to Alice's transmit beamforming weights). To examine how SNR impacts Eve's CSI inference accuracy, we consider measurements only from scenarios in which the average condition number of H AE is 5, and plot the median of C (with 25th and 75th percentile) under different SNR in Fig. 9(a) . We do not use the mean and standard deviation here because the distribution of C is highly non-normal (as shown in Fig. 8 ). It can be observed from the blue solid curve (when W E = W (2) E is employed by CSIsnoop) that, the median of C decreases to below 0.96 when the SNR becomes smaller than 15 dB. On the other side, when the SNR is over 25 dB, increasing the SNR further does not lead to a large increase of C.
Moreover, as discussed in Sec. 3.1, there are 2 ways for Eve to compute the adaptive filter based on known-transmitted-symbol attack. Therefore, Fig. 9 (a) also depicts the median of C when W E = W (1) E is employed. It can be seen that W E is used. The main reason is that during the computation of W (1) E , the random noise in the signals are amplified. Thus the reduction in estimation accuracy increases with larger noise strength (or equivalently, smaller signal SNR).
Condition Number of H AE . After W E = W
E (Eq. (7)) is estimated from known-transmitted-symbol attack, CSIsnoop computes Alice's transmit beamforming weights as W A P = H −1 AE W E . Therefore, the accuracy of W A is also related to the condition number of H AE . To analyze this factor, we consider measurements only from scenarios in which the average signal SNR is 30 dB, and plot the median of C with different condition number of H AE in Fig.  9(b) . In our experiments, we use the 2-norm condition number of H AE , which is defined as the ratio of the largest singular value of H AE to the smallest. It can be seen that C decreases when H AE has a larger condition number. In particular, the estimation accuracy becomes worse than the 15 dB SNR point in Fig. 9(a) when the average condition number of H AE exceeds 35.
Therefore, if Eve wants to increase her accuracy, she needs to search for favorable places where the signal SNR is large but the condition number of H AE is small. Given that Alice is often fixed, one of the best strategies for Eve is to find a favorable place near Alice. Moreover, when Eve is near Alice, the change of H AE due to environmental mobility also tends to be smaller.
Number of Known Symbols and Overheard Packets
Here, we evaluate whether the CSIsnoop's inference accuracy is improved when Eve has more observations. Specifically, Eve can (1) still overhear just one transmission but have more known symbols, or (2) overhear multiple packets within the channel coherence time of H AB j and combine the observations. More Known Symbols. When Eve overhears just one transmission but has more known symbols, she can calculate W E in Eq. (7) with smaller error and thereby increase her estimation accuracy. To study this, we suppose that Eve knows from 10 to 50 symbols and plot the change of C in Fig. 10(a) .
It can be observed that when Eve is in a favorable location (where the signal SNR is high while the condition number of H AE is small), having more known symbols does not lead to a large increase of C, especially when the number of known symbols is over 20. This is because CSIsnoop already achieves a very accurate estimation with as few as only 10 known symbols (median of C is 0.993). In contrast, when Eve is restricted to a non-favorable location, the estimation accuracy keeps improving when Eve has more known symbols: from 10 to 50 known symbols, the median of C increases from 0.95 to 0.98. Nonetheless, even with 50 known symbols, the estimation is still less accurate compared to the results when Eve is in a favorable place but has only 10 known symbols.
Overhearing Multiple Packets. When Eve overhears multiple transmissions, she can combine them to improve accuracy. Fig.  10(b) and Fig. 10(c) depict C when the number of overheard packets increases from 1 to 5. Specifically, SubSpaceSearch indicates that Eve maximizes Eq. (16) when combining the multiple observations, while SimpAvg indicates that Eve simply calculates the average. Similar to Fig. 10(a) , it can be observed that when Eve is in a favorable location, the computation based on 1 overheard transmission is already very accurate, and repeated observations do not lead to a large increase in C. In comparison, when Eve is in a non-favorable location, accuracy significantly improves with more overheard transmissions. Yet, again, even with 5 transmissions, the accuracy is still worse than when Eve is in a favorable place but overhears just 1 transmission. Therefore, compared to increasing the number of known symbols or overhearing multiple transmissions, it is more important for Eve to have a favorable H AE .
Furthermore, it can be observed from Fig. 10(b) and Fig. 10 (c) that simply averaging the results of multiple overheard packets can actually lead to worse estimation accuracy. This is mainly due to the random phase rotation from fractional timing offset that is added to every single observation. For example, if for 2 overheard packets, the computed channel are H AB and e j π H AB , SimpAvg computes the average value to be H est = 0, while SubSpaceSearch maximizes ∥H est H H AB ∥ + ∥H est (e j π H AB ) H ∥ and obtains H est = H AB .
Number of Clients and Data Streams
In the following, we evaluate the performance of CSIsnoop in the generalized scenario of Sec. 3.2 and CSIsnoop+a of Sec. 4. Table 1 lists the detailed description and Fig. 11 plots the results. Table 1 ). The average signal SNR at Eve is 30 dB and the average condition number of H AE is 5. 
CSIsnoop+a
Alice has K antennas but there are K − 1 Bobs. Eve fakes Bob K by using her first antenna. So Alice still sends K data streams.
It can be observed in Fig. 11 that the estimation accuracy of the 3 cases of Table 1 are very similar, with the difference among the median of C within 0.001. But CSIsnoop+a has a smaller variance than CSIsnoop. This is because when Eve joins in the downlink transmission, part of W E become known to Eve. As a result, Eve can obtain a more accurate W A and thereby H AB . It should also be noted that there is a significant difference between the "Multi" case here and the discussion in Fig. 10(b-c) : in Fig. 10(b-c) , each overheard transmission contains k data streams, whereas in the "Multi" case each overheard transmission contains fewer than k data streams. Therefore, even if Eve overhears more than one transmission in the "Multi" case, she may not obtain more information compared to the base case. Thus estimation accuracy may not be improved.
Computation of H AE with Encrypted
Sounding Sequence
Finally, we examine how accurately Eve can estimate H AE when Alice encrypts the channel sounding sequence [19] . Similar to the analysis of H AB , it is equivalent that Eve estimates H AE and d ·H AE , where d is an unknown complex number. Therefore, we still use the absolute normalized correlation defined in Eq. (17) to evaluate the estimation accuracy of H AE , which here is computed as (H AE,comp and H AE,meas are first expanded into 1-dimensional vectors)
We first fix the average condition number of H AE to be 5 and plot the variation of C AE over signal SNR in Fig. 12(a) . It can be seen that under the same channel condition (in terms of H AE ), the computation of H AE is more accurate than that of H AB (by comparing with Fig. 9(a) ). Moreover, it can also be observed that, while the accuracy of H AE reduces when the SNR becomes smaller, the impact of noise strength is very small from 20 dB to 30 dB, and the median of C AE is constantly above 0.996.
In comparison, the average condition number of H AE has a larger impact on the estimation accuracy. Specifically, in Fig. 12(b) , median of C AE decreases to 0.96 when the condition number increases to 40. The 25th percentile also reduces to below 0.94. Nonetheless, compared to Fig. 9(b) , the change of C AE is still small. In other words, the estimation of H AE is more robust to the channel condition between Alice and Eve than the estimation of H AB . This is mainly because that the latter computation includes more steps. With the estimated H AE , Eve can further use CSIsnoop to compute H AB , even if Alice encrypts the channel sounding sequence.
CSI-BASED ATTACKS
In this section, we study how Eve can use the computed H AB,comp to attack the network, including computing the CSI-based password and selectively reducing the uplink throughput of a target Bob.
Computing CSI-Based Password
Because CSI decorrelates over half a wavelength in rich scattering environments, which is several centimeters in 2.4/5 GHz WiFi, schemes were proposed to generate a password between a transmitter and a receiver based on the CSI. It was assumed that such a password cannot be estimated by Eve even if Eve is close to Alice or Bob. However, by using CSIsnoop, Eve can compute CSI between Alice and Bob and use it to further compute the CSI-based password.
To evaluate how much Eve can estimate about the password, we consider the password generating scheme proposed in [12] : Alice and Bob quantify the relative amplitude of each sub-carrier of the downlink channel to generate password bits. Therefore, for q-bit quantization, the total bits of the password will be k ·n ·q, where k is the number of antennas at Alice and n is the number of sub-carriers that are used. Moreover, we assume that Eve's average SNR is 30 dB and the average condition number of H AE is 5. After estimating the CSI from Alice to Bob, Eve uses the same method to compute the password. Fig. 13 (a) depicts experimental results for the bit mis-match rate between the password computed by Eve and the password generated by Bob. As discussed in Fig. 8 , when Alice has more antennas, Eve's estimation accuracy of H AB decreases. Consequently, the bit mis-match rate increases with the number of antennas at Alice, ranging from 7.5% to 9.5% for 2-bit quantization, and from 10.2% to 13.1% for 3-bit quantization.
However, Alice and Bob will also have bit mis-match between them. According to [12] , in an indoor environment, the 2-bit scheme has bit mis-match rate between 3.5% and 5%, and the 3-bit scheme has bit mismatch rate between 5.6% and 7.9%. Suppose that the bit mis-match rate between Alice and Bob and between Eve and Bob is x% and y%, respectively. It can be calculated that Eve can estimate at least (100 −x −y)/(100 −x) of the common bits between Alice and Bob. Therefore, for 2-bit and 3-bit quantization, CSIsnoop enables Eve to estimate over 90% and 85% of the password, respectively. For a practical system, there is still a step called "Information Reconciliation" for Alice and Bob to correct their bit mis-match by exchanging some packets over the air [12] . Eve may overhear these packets to further improve her computation of the password.
Selectively Decreasing Uplink Throughput
Concurrent uplink transmission of multiple data streams has been regarded as an important feature in the next generation wireless standard [4, 6, 18] . Receiver-based ZF-BF can be used to remove the inter-stream interference by projecting the desired signals onto the sub-space orthogonal to the interference. Nonetheless, this same property can be exploited by Eve to selectively jam the uplink transmission of Bob j . In particular, once Eve knows the downlink CSI of Bob j , she can send interference only in the sub-space of Bob j 's uplink signals. This is fundamentally different from current jamming techniques [14, 23] , which treat all the concurrent data streams as the same.
In above analysis of this paper, we only consider the downlink CSI of Bob j , which we denote as H d
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CSI-based security schemes. Because CSI decorrelates over half a wavelength, it has been proposed as a security mechanism. One technique is artificial noise, which degrades the eavesdropper's channel by sending artificial noise in the null-space of the desired signals. The secrecy rate achieved by this scheme was analyzed in [5] . Experiments further demonstrated that the eavesdropper consistently has an SINR 15 dB smaller than the desired receiver [1] . Besides artificial noise, the transmitter and the receiver can also use CSI to generate a password between them. The generating framework as well as the secret key extraction speed were studied both theoretically [13] and experimentally [12] . What is more, the AP can also use CSI to authenticate the source of packets: if the packets are from the same client, they should have similar CSI within channel coherence time. Both averaged CSI magnitudes [9] and angle-of-arrival information [22] were proposed as a signature.
However, these schemes assume that the malicious node does not know the CSI between the transmitter and the receiver. Otherwise, they will be no longer safe. Indeed, artificial noise was demonstrated to be removable once CSI is known [16] . Likewise, link signatures based on CSI can be spoofed as long as the attacker has information about the uplink CSI of the client [3] . Furthermore, we demonstrate in this paper that once the attacker knows the CSI, a password generated out of it can also be predicted. Thus, because a malicious node with CSIsnoop is able to compute the CSI of any client by overhearing their downlink data transmission, the above designs need to be reconsidered for multi-user WLANs.
Encrypted CSI measurement. Even though CSI quickly decorrelates over distance, the explicit channel sounding process in current beamforming standards [7, 8] provides an opportunity for a malicious node to learn the CSI of clients by overhearing their CSI measurement feedback. One solution is to encrypt the feedback, but it results in additional overhead for the clients and the AP to establish the encryption and decryption key. In comparison, CSIsec uses a random sequence unknown to Eve instead of the pre-defined one to sound the channel by the AP [19] .
In contrast, CSIsnoop uses the downlink data transmission instead of the channel sounding process to compute the CSI of clients. Moreover, while it was discussed in [19] that an encrypted channel sounding sequence can prevent the malicious node from estimating her channel (which is an important pre-filtering step in [16] ), we show that the malicious node can still do so by employing her multiple antennas and the L-LTF field prepended to every packet [7, 8] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we describe CSIsnoop, a framework by which the malicious node can infer CSI between the AP and clients by overhearing downlink multi-user transmission. We implement CSIsnoop in the software defined radio WARP v3 and show that the absolute normalized correlation between the computed CSI by CSIsnoop and the measured CSI by clients has an average of over 0.99. We also demonstrate that the malicious node can now use the computed CSI to break CSI-based security schemes, which urges reconsideration of the use of CSI as a shared secret in multi-user MIMO WLANs.
